

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1 C. Personnel Allocation, Manning, Use of Civilians, Training:

1. Collocation and Joint Manning:

The COMINT collection effort abroad is manned almost entirely by the Military Departments. Most of the stations have been uni-service, and many, even though located in physical proximity to each other, were maintained by duplicate supply and administrative channels. With the agreement of the Director, NSA, the Committee adopted formal criteria under which collocated or jointly manned intercept stations will henceforth be conducted. The Committee also adopted and monitored the installation of a host service concept at a number of stations, [REDACTED]

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2. Civilian Operators:

The Committee devoted considerable time to the study of utilizing civilians in the COMINT effort overseas. One study dealt with the desirability and feasibility. A second study dealt with overseas requirements, program and administrative plan. The Committee identified the following categories in which civilian personnel could effectively be utilized:

a. As analysts, mechanics, and personnel with similar skills.

b. As intercept operators to man certain (Category A type) positions.

c. As senior "career official" advisory personnel from NSA assigned to the cryptologic agencies on a detail basis.

d. As technical consultants to serve as specialists in the general search, technical search, and [REDACTED] activities.

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e. As roving teams for the purpose of conducting special operations of concern to the COMINT industry but beyond the immediate capability of any Service to provide on a continuing basis.

The Committee felt it desirable to utilize categories a, d, and e above immediately, and recommended that the Secretary consider recommendations for further action under b above, as assigned to the Director, NSA, by the Secretary, within six months.

NSA review(s) completed.

OSD review(s) completed.

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The Committee considered several plans to utilize civilians, including an NSA plan in which civilians would man a total of 156 positions five years hence but was unable to arrive at an agreed plan at this time.

The Committee developed a plan for utilizing technicians, technical consultants, and roving teams, and agreed on principles for the use of and administration of civilians in overseas operations.

3. Cryptologic Training:

The Committee has examined a report, prepared by representatives of NSA and the Military Departments, on the national cryptologic training program, without which the highly specialized NSA effort would soon fail.

The National Security Agency monitors a rather elaborate program at all levels from basic operators training to postgraduate university study. The Committee has noted that certain elements of this training which characterized the expansion period in NSA have now been reduced. The Committee feels that the present system under which the Military Departments conduct training under NSA approved standards for basic intercept operators is the best that can be devised under existing circumstances. There is evidence that intercept operators still arrive at their field stations with inadequate training, and there is some loss of time and productive effort resulting from the necessity for re-training or additional training at the intercept site. At those stations where effective leadership exists, such training is excellent and little loss of time results. At other stations, the effort is less rewarding. There is clearly a requirement for more effective monitorship of such training, and for greater recognition of and adherence to the standards promulgated by NSA. Basic operating training standards should be reviewed.

The Committee has agreed to the continuation of centralized training by NSA for individuals requiring unique skills, and in those fields such as scarce languages where the demand for personnel is so limited as to justify only a single facility. The Committee considered a recommendation that NSA establish a consolidated COMINT language school. It rejected this recommendation on the ground that the additional expense was probably unjustified, and on the ground that NSA's language requirements at the basic level were not so discrete as to make departmental language training unsuitable.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

A. DOD Organization for COMINT Production:

1. OSD Organization: